

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 121732Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1682

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0375

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET DEPREP SHUSTOV
ON JULY 9, 1976

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JULY 9, US DEPREP MET WITH SOVIET DEPREP SHUSTOV AT LATTER'S REQUEST. DURING CONVERSATION, SHUSTOV INDICATED THAT SOVIET REP KHLESTOV WOULD BE LEAVING THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE END OF THE PRESENT ROUND AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY NICHOLAI CONSTANTINOVICH TARASOV AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. SHUSTOV STRESSED THE NEED FOR A DISPASSIONATE AND AMICABLE DATA DISCUSSION WITH BOTH SIDES EXERCISING SELF-RESTRAINT IN NOT RAISING ACCUSATIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL CORRECTNESS OF EACH OTHER'S FIGURES UNTIL AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL COMPARISON OF COUNTING RULES HAD BEEN PROVIDED. SHUSTOV CLAIMED THAT THE EASTERN DATA TABLED BY KHLESTOV IN THE JUNE 10 PLENARY COVERED ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE REDUCTION AREA. SHUSTOV TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO STATE THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT PRESS THE WEST TO TABLE WESTERN DATA ALTHOUGH THE EAST EXPECTED SUCH DATA TO BE TABLED IN DUE COURSE TO PERMIT DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT ROUND. HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT MENTION FRENCH IN ANY WAY, BUT CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR DELAY IN SUBMISSION OF ALLIED DATA. END SUMMARY.

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2. US DEPREP SAID IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE A LOOK AT THE NEXT

ROUND. HOW WOULD THE SOVIET DELEGATION LOOK AT THAT POINT? SHUSTOV SAID SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS IT WAS NOW EXCEPT FOR KHLESTOV'S DEPARTURE. KHLESTOV HAD WANTED STRONGLY TO GET BACK TO LEGAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY LAW OF THE SEA. SHUSTOV BELIEVED TARASOV WOULD MAKE A GOOD DELEGATION HEAD. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE THE SAME BACK-UP TEAM IN MOSCOW, INCLUDING DEPUTY MINISTER KORNIENKO.

3. US DEP REP SAID HE ASSUMED THAT ONE OF THE TOPICS OF THE NEXT ROUND WOULD BE DISCUSSION OF DATA. AS US REPS HAD EARLIER TOLD SOVIETS, BOTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE DISPASSIONATE DISCUSSION AND AVOID PREMATURE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE DATA TABLED BY THE OTHER SIDE. SHUSTOV SAID HE STRONGLY AGREED. HE HOPED DATA DISCUSSION COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE, WITHOUT ANY ACCUSATIONS THAT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WAS "COOKING" ITS OWN DATA. INITIAL DISCUSSION COULD FOCUS ON THE COUNTING RULES USED BY BOTH SIDES. THERE MIGHT BE STOPS IN THE DISCUSSION TO PERMIT EITHER SIDE TO GET AUTHORITY TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, BUT EACH SHOULD TRY TO ANSWER ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS.

4. SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTY ON THE WESTERN SIDE IN PROVIDING NATIONAL TOTALS. US DEPREP SAID IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN IF THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION RESULTED IN ANY REQUIREMENT FOR THE TABLING OF NATIONAL TOTALS. SHUSTOV WAS AWARE FROM HIS OWN PRIOR CONVERSATIONS THAT SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY EASTERN INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. US REPS HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD SOVIET REPS THAT THEIR EMPHASIS ON THIS TOPIC WAS SHORTSIGHTED AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

5. SHUSTOV THEN TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO STATE THAT HE WISHED US DELEGATION TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT APPLYING PRESSURE FOR A RAPID WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN REQUEST TO TABLE UPDATED WESTERN DATA. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR THE WEST TO REVIEW ITS DATA AND WISHED TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS APPLYING PRESSURE FOR RAPID TABLING OF THAT DATA. EASTERN REPS HAD OF COURSE STATED THAT THEY ASSUMED WESTERN DATA WOULD BE FORTHCOMING SOON. BUT THESE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN BASED ONLY ON EARLIER WESTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE WEST WAS READY TO ENGAGE IN IMMEDIATE RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE.

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SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER WESTERN DATA WHEN TABLED WOULD COVER AIR MANPOWER DATA. US DEPREP SAID IT WOULD. SHUSTOV DID NOT MENTION THE FRENCH ISSUE AT ANY POINT, BUT US DEPREP GAINED IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS NONETHELESS FULLY AWARE OF IT.

6. US DEPREP SAID HE AGREED WITH SHUSTOV'S OBSERVATION THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD AVOID ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH CONCERNING OTHER'S DATA. HOWEVER, MANY PEOPLE IN THE WEST WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE

LARGE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER AND THE FIGURES TABLED BY THE SOVIETS. THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THIS DISCREPANCY WAS CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS EASTERN BEHAVIOR THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD CHALLENGED THE WESTERN ASSERTIONS OF A LARGE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DISPARITY IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT WAYS, BEGINNING WITH STATEMENTS THAT THE WESTERN FIGURES WERE VALID ONLY FOR THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND OMITTED OTHER WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA, THAT GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SHOULD BE REALLOCATED FROM GROUND TO AIR, THAT THE FRG READY RESERVE SHOULD BE COUNTED IN, AND THAT THE EAST HAD A RIGHT TO DEDUCT A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM ITS COUNT BECAUSE THE FUNCTIONS THEY PERFORMED FOR EASTERN ARMED FORCES WERE PERFORMED LARGELY BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST. THESE ACTIONS WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE EASTERN FIGURES THE EAST HAD TABLED WHICH APPARENTLY SHOWED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. IF THESE HAD BEEN THE EASTERN FIGURES ALL ALONG, WHY HAD THE EAST MADE ALL THESE EFFORTS TO CHIP AWAY AT THE DISPARITY?

7. SHUSTOV REPLIED THAT THE EAST HAD TABLED DATA WHEN IT DID IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE IT CONSIDERED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS JUSTIFIED THIS ACTION AT THE GIVEN POINT WHEN IT WAS TAKEN. US DEPREP ASKED WHETHER THE DATA TABLED BY THE EAST INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE CATEGORIES OF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, AS WELL AS ALL OF THE REAR ECHELON FUNCTIONS WHICH THE EAST HAD PREVIOUSLY ENUMERATED AS FUNCTIONS PERFORMED LARGELY BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST BUT BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE EAST. SHUSTOV THEN REFERRED TO POLISH REP'S STATEMENT IN JULY 6 INFORMAL THAT THE EAST HAD TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WESTERN VIEWS ON FORCE DEFINITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH TABLING ITS DATA. SHUSTOV SAID THIS STATEMENT MEANT THAT IN COMPILING ITS
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DATA, THE EAST HAD APPLIED THE CRITERION WHICH THE WEST HAD ADVANCED IN THE DEFINITIONS DISCUSSION, ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE EASTERN TOTALS INCLUDED ALL SUCH PERSONNEL.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1683

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0375

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8. US DEPREP ASKED IF THE EAST HAD EXCLUDED ANY ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF BORDER FORCES AND UNITS OF OTHER MINISTRIES OR DEPARTMENTS. SHUSTOV SAID THE EAST HAD NOT DONE SO. US DEPREP ASKED SHUSTOV HOW HE WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE LARGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WESTERN ESTIMATES OF EASTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND EASTERN FIGURES ON THE SAME PERSONNEL. SHUSTOV SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. HE BELIEVED THERE WAS SOME RATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR IT WHICH WOULD EMERGE DURING THE COURSE OF DATA DISCUSSION. PERHAPS THE REASON LAY IN WESTERN COUNTING RULES.

9. US DEPREP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD CAUSED SOME CONFUSION IN RECENT DISCUSSION OF THEIR FEB 19 PROPOSAL BY MAKING CONFLICTING STATEMENTS ABOUT THE COMMITMENTS THEY EXPECTED FROM NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A STAGE ONE AGREEMENT. SHUSTOV SAID AS FAR AS THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED, THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT SOME WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO PROVIDE A REAL ASSURANCE THAT THE OTHERS WOULD ACTUALLY REDUCE IN A SECOND STAGE. HE DID NOT THINK THE WESTERN POSITION WAS VERY LOGICAL. THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD SAID THEY WANTED THE ASSURANCE OF PRIOR SOVIET REDUCTIONS BEFORE THEY REDUCED THEIR OWN FORCES. UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THEY WOULD HAVE THIS ASSURANCE. IF THE SOVIET REDUCTIONS DID NOT TAKE PLACE AS THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED, NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

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WOULD NOT HAVE TO HONOR ANY OBLIGATION THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO.

10. US DEPREP SAID THAT THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF PHASING. THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF PHASING WAS THAT ALL THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WANTED EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING AND EASTERN AGREEMENT ON SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD MOVE TO THAT COMMON CEILING BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND PHASE. BESIDES, EASTERN REPS WERE CONFUSING THE ISSUE: AT ONE MOMENT THEY SAID THEY WANTED ASSURANCES ON TIMING. THE NEXT MINUTE THEY SAID THEY WANTED ASSURANCES NOT ONLY ON TIMING BUT THAT STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS WOULD INCLUDE ARMAMENTS AND SO ON. SHUSTOV WEAKLY SAID THAT THE LATTER POINTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN A COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REGARDING STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS. THEY COULD BE IN SOME THIRD PART OF A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, PERHAPS IN A PREAMBLE.

11. US DEPREP SAID THIS WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE. THE EAST WAS ASKING TOO MUCH. THEY SHOULD LEAVE ISSUES LIKE THE SHAPE OF STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS AND WHETHER OR NOT THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD INCLUDE ARMAMENTS FOR SETTLEMENT IN STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS ITSELF. IN RESPONSE, SHUSTOV SAID THE WESTERN STAGE ONE REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS WHOLLY INEQUITABLE. THE WEST WANTED TO ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT THAT ALL WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF INDIVIDUALS AND THAT ALL EASTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF UNITS. THE SAME RULE SHOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES. IF UNITS, THEN UNITS. IF INDIVIDUALS, THEN INDIVIDUALS.

12. SHUSTOV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS. US DEPREP SAID THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE REALISTIC. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TOOK IN FULL SERIOUSNESS THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT AFTER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE THAT THEIR TERRITORY WAS ADJACENT AND THAT THEIR FORCES ON THAT TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. HOW COULD THE WESTERN EUROPEANS THINK ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THESE CONDITIONS?

13. SHUSTOV ASKED ABOUT THE JULY 4 REMARK BY FRG CHANCELOR
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SCHMIDT IN AN AUSTRIAN TELEVISION PROGRAM TO THE EFFECT THAT, IF THE FORCES OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES WERE REDUCED, THE FRG WOULD NOT WISH TO INCREASE ITS OWN FORCES TO MAKE UP THE DIFFERENCE. HOW DID THIS STATEMENT SQUARE WITH WESTERN INSISTENCE ON A COLLECTIVE CEILING DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE SAME OUTCOME?

14. US DEPREP SAID SCHMIDT STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FRG'S RELATIONS WITH ITS WESTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS. THE COLLECTIVE CEILING COMMITMENT WOULD BE AN OBLIGATION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE

TWO. WHY SHOULD THE WESTERN EUROPEANS OBLIGATE THEMSELVES NOT TO MAKE UP THE DIFFERENCE IF ONE OF THEM REDUCED ITS FORCES AFTER AN AGREEMENT? NOT TO DO THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WESTERN FORCES COULD BE UNDER AN EVER LOWER PRACTICAL CEILING IN THE EVENT OF SUBSEQUENT DECREASES IN THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHEREAS THE SOVIETS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THAT POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK AND EAST GERMAN FORCES WERE KEPT UP TO THEIR FULL AMOUNT.

15. SHUSTOV SAID, LEAVING ASIDE THE COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR A MOMENT, SOME WAY WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND FOR THE WEST TO INDICATE TO THE EAST WHAT THE TOTAL REDUCTION OF EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD BE IN STAGE TWO. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS DID NOT WANT TO BE IN THE RIDICULOUS POSITION OF HAVING AGREED TO SOME REDUCTION SCHEME AND THEN FINDING OUT THAT THE FRG WAS ONLY GOING TO REDUCE TEN MEN IN STAGE TWO.

16. US DEPREP SAID HE CONSIDERED THAT THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SITUATION WAS A SOVIET ONE. EASTERN REPS HAD CONTINUALLY PRESSED FOR NATIONAL CEILINGS. THIS HAD MADE SOME PEOPLE IN THE WEST THINK THAT IF THEY GAVE THE EAST NATIONAL REDUCTION TOTALS, SUCH ACTION COULD BE A STEP TOWARDS NATIONAL CEILINGS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE TREATED SEPARATELY AND IN ADVANCE OF THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. END TEXT OF REPORT.

17. ON JULY 12 US DEPREP REPORTED TO AD HOC GROUP ON THIS DISCUSSION WITH SHUSTOV ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: US DEPREP HAD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH SHUSTOV AT LATTER'S INVITATION ON JULY 9. THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN RATHER GENERAL IN NATURE, WITH FEW NEW ELEMENTS. SHUSTOV SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT THERE WOULD BE
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A DISCUSSION OF DATA IN THE NEXT ROUND. HE STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING BROAD CHARACTERIZATIONS AS TO THE ACCURACY OR INACCURACY OF THE DATA PUT DOWN BY EITHER SIDE UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. HE AGAIN SEEMED TO BE MAKING THE CLAIM THAT THE EAST HAD COUNTED ALL WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA IN ITS DATA. SHUSTOV TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO STATE THAT THE EAST WAS NOT PRESSING THE WEST TO PUT DOWN DATA AT THIS TIME. US DEPREP COMPLAINED ABOUT AMBIGUITY OF EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEB 19 AS REGARDS STAGE ONE COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN RESPONSE, SHUSTOV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE INEQUITY OF THE WESTERN PHASE I REDUCTION POSITION, ASKING FOR REDUCTIONS IN WHICH THE US WOULD REDUCE BY INDIVIDUALS AND THE SOVIETS BY UNITS. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

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